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Abstract
The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the
debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign
guarantor. That is their charm. As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed
countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being
favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.
But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities
needs to restructure its debt? The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out
of the restructuring. To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the
sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of the guarantees
demand payment in full after the restructuring closes.
Attempting to shoehorn sovereign contingent liabilities into a debt
restructuring, however, is a particularly challenging task. There are few precedents
for how to do so, and no good precedents. The explosion in the size of contingent
sovereign obligations since the financial crisis began in 2008 inevitably means that
these issues will need to be confronted sooner or later, probably sooner.
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It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a sovereign borrower in
possession of an uncomfortably large stock of debt must be in want of camouflage.
And since the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, many sovereigns seem
to have found it -- in the form of contingent sovereign liabilities.
In every situation where a sovereign lends its credit support to
facilitate a borrowing by a third party, the sovereign will have had a choice. The
alternative to guaranteeing the debt of the third party is for the sovereign to borrow
the money in its own name and on-lend the proceeds to that entity. The difference is
that a direct liability appears on a sovereign’s own balance sheet; a contingent
liability probably will not. In the last five years, as the need to finance Great
Recession stimulus measures has swollen the debt-to-GDP ratios of many developed
countries, sovereigns have sought to camouflage the true extent of their liabilities by
resorting to the issue of contingent, rather than direct, obligations.1
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1

See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., State Debt Guarantees That are Hidden Add to Worries in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013; Christopher Spink, Contingent Sovereign Liabilities a ‘Landmine’, INT’L
FINANCING REV., May 26, 2012; David Reilly, Time to End the Fiction of ‘Frannie’, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21, 2012. Mr. Reilly, in his piece, writes:
That [a new requirement that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay all
of their profit to the U.S. Government as a dividend] bolsters the
argument that Fannie and Freddie should be included on the
government’s balance sheet. Of course, that is politically
unpalatable: The inclusion of their combined $5.3 trillion in
liabilities would balloon the nearly $16 trillion in total federal
debt outstanding and breach the debt ceiling.
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I. Sovereign Comfort
A benignant sovereign may bestow its credit support to a third party
in a variety of ways.
(a)

Explicit sovereign guarantees

At one end of the spectrum will be an explicit contractual guarantee
by the sovereign expressed in words like these:
The Republic hereby unconditionally and irrevocably
guarantees (as primary obligor and not merely as
surety) the punctual payment when due, whether at
stated maturity, by acceleration or otherwise, of all
obligations of the Obligor now or hereafter existing
under this Agreement….
Such an explicit guarantee will sometimes come with all the trappings of an
independent, separately enforceable, legal obligation on the part of the sovereign
guarantor -- representations, covenants, waiver of sovereign immunity, choice of
foreign governing law, submission to foreign court jurisdiction and appointment of
an agent for service of process abroad.
Explicit sovereign guarantees may also be extended by operation of
law. Some (but only some) deposit insurance schemes benefit from the full faith and
credit of the host sovereign. In some countries, certain state-owned enterprises will
by law carry the full faith and credit of their sovereign in their borrowing activities.
(b)

Implicit sovereign assurances

The other side of the spectrum of sovereign credit support consists of
nothing more than a background shadow; a figurative -- perhaps even a literal -wink, nod and reassuring smile to the prospective investor. These are normally
situations in which the primary obligor is so closely associated with the sovereign in
the mind of the market (such as a political sub-division or an important state-owned
enterprise) that lenders to the primary obligor are passively encouraged in the belief
that the sovereign could never tolerate a circumstance in which the primary obligor
tarnishes the reputation of the sovereign by defaulting on its debts. Nothing is ever
said openly about sovereign credit support in these situations, but the perceptive
investor is expected to see the warm arm of the sovereign wrapped in a reassuring
manner around the shoulder of the debtor.
(c)

In between

Between these two extremes of unambiguously explicit sovereign
guarantees and gauzily implicit sovereign reassurances are many gradations. These
include:
2
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partial guarantees -- the sovereign agrees to cover only a portion
of the amount payable by the primary obligor;



indemnities -- the sovereign agrees to indemnify the creditor for
any residual loss but only after all efforts to recover the debt from
the primary obligor have been exhausted;



keepwells -- the sovereign’s promise to the lender is limited to an
undertaking that the primary obligor will at all times have a
positive net worth (often expressed as a nominal amount), but the
sovereign is free to achieve this objective of solvency in any way
it wishes (by recapitalizing the primary obligor, assuming or
paying some of its debts, lending money to the primary obligor,
etc.); and



comfort letters -- an aptly-named instrument, the comfort letter, in
its most innocuous form, merely assures the lender that the
sovereign is aware that the primary obligor is borrowing the
money, that the sovereign does not object to the transaction and
that the obligor continues to enjoy the affections of the sovereign.

The remainder of this paper will deal only with explicit sovereign
guarantees. For obvious reasons, it is impossible to identify or quantify implicit
guarantees because they exist only in the eye of the beholder.2
II. Contingent Charms
The principal charm (for the guarantor) of a contingent obligation lies
precisely in its contingent nature; no one can be sure, at the time the debt is incurred,
whether it will be paid by the primary obligor without recourse to the guarantor.
This feature allows guarantors, with the blessing of the accounting profession, to
treat the resulting liabilities as off balance sheet unless and until something happens
down the road that makes it probable that the guarantee will in fact be called. For
sovereigns already groaning under dangerously bloated debt-to-GDP ratios, this
accounting treatment allows the sovereign to continue to raise capital on the strength
of the sovereign’s credit standing while not visibly increasing the size of the
sovereign’s own stock of debt. The only catch is that the loans must be directed in
the first instance to a third party (the primary obligor) under the cover of the
2

This vagueness about whether a particular loan does or does not enjoy the credit support of the
sovereign carries its own risks. In a distressed debt context, a lender that thinks itself the beneficiary
of an implicit sovereign guarantee is apt to howl if the sovereign orphans the primary obligor and
allows the loan to go into default. The United Arab Emirates, burnt by just this reaction during the
Dubai financial crisis of 2009, subsequently changed its policy to ensure that there would be no future
misunderstandings about which loans to state-linked enterprises did, and which did not, enjoy
government support. See Camilla Hall, Abu Dhabi Tightens Rules for Debt Issued to State-Linked
Businesses, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012 at 15.
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sovereign guarantee. That third party may be related to the sovereign (a state-owned
enterprise for example), or it may be a private sector entity whose activities the
sovereign wishes to encourage. A construction project undertaken by a private
sector entity in the tourism industry is a good example.
Accounting standards differ somewhat in how they describe the
circumstances which allow a guarantor to keep a contingent liability off of its own
balance sheet. For corporate borrowers, the International Accounting Standards
Board (IAS 37) directs that if a present obligation “may, but probably will not,
require an outflow of resources” from the guarantor, it need not be “recognized” on
the balance sheet of the guarantor, but should be disclosed in financial statements as
a contingent liability.3 Where the likelihood of an outflow of resources from the
guarantor is “remote”, even the need for financial disclosure is omitted.4
The general principle established by Eurostat (the statistical office of
the European Union) for presenting the accounts of EU member states is broadly
similar. As long as a state guarantee is not called by beneficiary, the liability is
recorded only on the balance sheet of the primary obligor, not the sovereign.5
Eurostat recognizes a “special case” exception to this general principle in situations
where need for the government to make debt service payments on the loan is open
and notorious from the outset. The Eurostat Manual describes the circumstances in
these terms:
Even though the liability is issued by the enterprise
itself, it may be right away considered with certainty as
an actual government liability if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
- the law authorizing issuance of the debt specifies the
government’s obligation of repayment.
- the budget of the State specifies each year the amount of
repayment.
- this debt, issued by the enterprise, is systematically repaid by the
State (interest and principal).
The liability must then be recorded directly -- as soon as at issuance -in the government financial account and balance sheet, and not in the
enterprise’s. Its amount must be taken into account in the government
debt.6

3
4

IASB Guidance on implementing IAS 37, Tables, Provisions and Contingent Liabilities.
IAS 37, para. 28

5

Eurostat, ESA95 Manual for Government Deficit and Debt (2002 ed.), II.4.3.2(1).

6

Id., II.4.3.2(2)
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A Note on the Database
The statistical information in this paper is based on our
survey of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued between
January 1, 1965 and July 1, 2013, as those bonds
appear on three publicly-available databases (Dealogic,
Perfect Information, Thomson One Banker).7 The
prospectuses and offering circulars for a total of 885
sovereign guaranteed bonds appearing on these
databases were reviewed.
This is not the total universe of sovereign guaranteed
bonds. The databases we use are commercial and
therefore usually include only those bonds that the
database operators believe will be of interest to paying
customers. Our information suggests that those
customers tend to be foreign rather than local investors
(domestic investors are often less concerned with legal
terms, having other mechanisms to police and monitor
the behavior of their sovereign). In other words, what
we report on is probably both a small and biased
(towards the interests of foreign investors) subset of
the universe of sovereign guaranteed bonds, the exact
size of which is entirely a matter of speculation.
We nevertheless believe that our results reveal the
general trends in the issuance of these instruments over
time, particularly in the areas of greatest relevance to
the subject of this paper -- number of issuances
(relative to direct sovereign bonds), governing law,
submission to court jurisdiction and waiver of
sovereign immunity.

7

We also examined the bonds available from Bloomberg, a fourth data source. However, there were
no bonds there that we had not already accessed from one of the other databases.
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III. The Explosion of 2008 - 2012
The data we have reviewed suggests that there was literally an
explosion in the number of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued after the onset of the
financial crisis in 2008, particularly in Europe. Using publicly-available information
(see box -- “A Note on the Data Base”), the results are shown on Figure 1:

Figure 1: Number of Bonds with Sovereign
Guarantees
Jan 1, 1965 - July 1, 2013 (n=885)
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Figure 2 reports a different, but equally striking, perspective -- it
focuses on the bonds and guarantees for the six euro area nations that were generally
perceived to be at the heart of the crisis starting in late 2009 – Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Belgium. These are also the six early entrants to the European
Monetary Union who have not traditionally been AAA rated (in contrast to, for
example, Germany and France). For these six nations, Figure 2 reports both the
numbers of sovereign bonds and guaranteed bonds issued during the quarter century
between January 1, 1988 and July 1, 2013. As the European crisis worsens during
the 2009-2012 period, the issuance of guaranteed bonds, particularly in comparison
to regular sovereign bonds, mushrooms.
Figure 2: Numbers of Bonds versus Guaranteed Bonds for Six
Non-AAA Early Euro Area Entrants (Jan 1,1988 - July 1, 2013)
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An excellent study released by Houlihan Lokey in May 20128
concluded that sovereign loan/bond guarantees in Europe as of end-2010 (a category
that did not include other forms of sovereign contingent exposure such as umbrella
guarantees or deposit insurance schemes) represented, on a GDP-weighted average,
13.1% of European GDP. In some countries, contingent exposure approached 30
percent of GDP. The trend noted in the Houlihan study was upward; the aggregate
size of guarantees outstanding in 2013 is undoubtedly significantly larger than it was
in 2010.
8

Houlihan Lokey, The Increasing Risks Posed by Contingent Liabilities: How to Measure and
Manage Them, Presentation at the 2012 Meeting of the Private Sector with the Paris Club and with
Representatives of Non Paris Club Bilateral Creditors, available at http://www.iif.com/emp/dr/
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There are two explanations for this dramatic rise in the popularity of
contingent sovereign obligations. The first, as discussed above, is the desire of overindebted developed countries to minimize further strains on their debt-to-GDP ratios.
The off balance sheet accounting treatment of contingent obligations permits this.
The second explanation relates to the methods by which the European Central Bank
has been prepared to provide liquidity assistance to banks in the Eurozone. A bank
in need of liquidity may either borrow money directly from the ECB’s discount
window by posting eligible collateral for the loan, or the bank may borrow the funds
from its own central bank through the Emergency Lending Assistance (“ELA”)
program. ELA funds, however, are ultimately also sourced from the ECB and the
Eurosystem and require the posting of eligible collateral by the borrowing bank.
Peripheral European banks that had exhausted their store of eligible
collateral for these programs came up with an ingenious solution -- they
manufactured eligible collateral.9 The bank issues a debt instrument to itself (there is
no third party purchaser of the instrument), takes the instrument to its local ministry
of finance and obtains a government guarantee, and then uses the instrument as
collateral for a new borrowing from ECB’s discount window or the ELA.10
In July 2012, the ECB is reported to have grown alarmed at the size of
the manufactured collateral that it was accepting at its discount window. The ECB
accordingly capped the amount of “specially tailored bonds” that could be used for
this purpose by Eurozone banks at the level each bank had outstanding at the time
the new policy was announced.11

9

The Cypriot Ministry of Finance charmingly refers to instruments issued for the sole purpose of
ECB/ELA discounting as “collateral for liquidity extraction from the European Central Bank.”
Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Public Debt Management Annual Report 2011 (March
2012) at 35.
10

See Sonia Sirletti & Elisa Martinuzzi, Italy Banks said to Use State-Backed Bonds for ECB Loans,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-20/italian-banksare-said-to-use-state-guaranteed-bonds-to-receive-ecb-loans.html
11

See Marc Jones, ECB Caps Use of State-Backed Bonds as Collateral, REUTERS, July 3, 2012,
available at http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKBRE8620V920120703; Joseph Cotterill, ECB
Collateral Shift Du Jour, FT ALPHAVILLE, July 3, 2012, available at
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/03/1070271/ecb-collateral-shift-du-jour/.
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IV. Precedents
One of the remorseless laws of sovereign debt management is that
size brings risk. If a component of a sovereign’s debt stock is of negligible size, that
component can sometimes escape a debt restructuring. For example, with only a
couple of exceptions, sovereign bonds were not restructured in the 1980s debt crisis.
The reason? Emerging market sovereign bond issues were rare in the period before
the crisis began in 1982 and the cost/benefit analysis weighed heavily in favor of
exempting those few bonds from the restructurings that engulfed commercial bank
loans and bilateral credits in that decade. But by the late 1990s, bonds had replaced
bank loans as the main component of the debt stocks of many emerging market
countries. Bond restructurings therefore became inevitable in countries with
insupportable debt loads.
If this remorseless law is indeed remorseless, it suggests that any
country carrying a significant stock of contingent sovereign obligations will
eventually need to address those liabilities if a generalized restructuring of the
country’s debt becomes necessary. Unfortunately, there are few historical
precedents to guide such an exercise.
In the sovereign debt restructurings of the 1980s, the aggregate
number of sovereign guarantees was small. This allowed them to be ignored in the
debt workouts of that era. The normal approach was to include a contingent liability
in the restructuring only if the beneficiary called on the guarantee before the
restructuring closed. But no pressure was placed on beneficiaries to call on their
guarantees. This set a precedent that has been followed in most sovereign debt
restructurings of the last thirty years.12
One notable exception was Grenada’s restructuring in 2005 where the
government’s contingent exposure equaled about 10% of its direct liabilities.
Grenada warned in the disclosure document for its restructuring that any contingent
obligation called by a beneficiary after the restructuring closed would be settled by
the delivery of consideration having a net present value equal to what the lender
would have received had the guarantee been called in time to be included in the main
restructuring.13

12

See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Treatment of Contingent Liabilities in a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, in FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (J. LaBrosse, R.
Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh eds., 2013).
13

See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpenski, Grenada’s Innovations, 2006 J. INT’L BANKING AND
REG., at 227, 231.
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The most recent precedent, Greece in 2012, is mixed. Although the
Hellenic Republic had hundreds of outstanding state guarantees at the time it
announced its debt restructuring in February of 2012, only 36 of those instruments
were made eligible for inclusion in the workout.14 The distinguishing characteristic
of the included instruments was that they fell within Eurostat’s “special cases”
exception to the general rule of off balance sheet treatment.15 In effect, Eurostat had
already concluded that the liabilities were central government debt and had to be
shown as such for Eurostat reporting purposes. Accordingly, they were also made
eligible for the restructuring of the central government’s direct debt.
Interestingly, although the main Greek debt restructuring was
facilitated by Greek legislation which retrofit a collective action mechanism on that
portion of the debt stock governed by Greek law (93% of the total), this legislation
did not attempt to sweep in the Greek Government guarantees of the guaranteed
bonds that were declared eligible for the restructuring, nor did the Greek legislature
attempt to pass separate legislation dealing with the Government’s local law
guarantees. The Greek authorities therefore avoided the legal and operational
complications (described below in Part VI of this paper) that would have attended an
attempt to restructure sovereign guarantees in a more coercive way.
V. The Restructurer’s Dilemma
If a country that is forced to restructure its outstanding (direct)
indebtedness also has a significant amount of contingent obligations coming due
during the period covered by that restructuring, there are a limited number of
options:
(i)

hope that the primary obligor will have the resources to pay the
debt without a call on the guarantee;

(ii)

hope that the beneficiary of the guarantee will voluntarily roll
over the debt at maturity;

(iii) honor the guarantee if it is called by paying the debt in full; and
(iv) dishonor the guarantee and attempt to restructure the liability
when it matures.
Option (i) is, of course, the sovereign’s preferred choice. But a
natural selection process is always at work in guarantees. Had the primary obligor
been perceived as fully creditworthy on its own, it would not have needed sovereign
credit support in order to raise capital at a tolerably low interest rate. The very

14

Twenty series of these guaranteed bonds (totaling €4.88 billion) were governed by Greek law; the
other sixteen series (totaling €4.97 billion) were governed by foreign law.
15

See text accompanying note 6 above.
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presence of a sovereign guarantee is thus a sign that the primary obligor might not be
good for the money when it comes due.
Option (ii), a voluntary rollover, is the sovereign’s second best choice.
Naturally, this requires the cooperation of either an indulgent, or a captive,
beneficiary. The “liquidity extraction bonds” (see footnote 9 below) that have been
issued by European banks for the purpose of accessing the ECB’s discount window
or the ELA program presumably fall into the category of “captive beneficiary”.
Demanding repayment of the loan to the discounting bank on its maturity date
would, in most of these situations, be pointless. Demanding payment from the
sovereign guarantor of the guaranteed bonds pledged to secure the loan would be
inconsistent with the official sector’s bailout program for the country. The result is a
captive beneficiary that has little choice but to roll over the loan and the
accompanying collateral for the loan.
Option (iii), pay up, can have several problems. The first, of course, is
money, a commodity that is rarely in abundant supply when a sovereign is compelled
to restructure its debts. Even if the cash is available, paying in full the beneficiary of
a state guarantee while all of the sovereign’s direct creditors have been forced to take
losses will naturally delight the former and enrage the latter. Finally, it is unlikely
that the financial predicates underlying the restructuring will have assumed payment
in full of maturing contingent liabilities during the adjustment period. If those
contingent liabilities are of a significant size, a policy of paying them may torpedo
the entire program.
Option (iv), attempt an ad hoc restructuring of a contingent liability
when it matures, raises the predicable issues of feasibility, cost and intercreditor
equity. It would also inevitably prolong the perception that the country remains
mired in a debt crisis.
The restructuring of a contingent obligation is more complicated than
the same exercise for direct sovereign debt. For one thing, until the guarantee is
called by the beneficiary, it remains contingent; the guarantor is rarely in a position
to force such a call. This gives the beneficiary the option of attempting to ride out
the sovereign’s restructuring of its direct obligations in the hope that after that main
restructuring closes, the sovereign will be reluctant to plunge back into another debt
crisis by dishonoring a call on the guarantee.
Moreover, even if beneficiaries can be persuaded to call upon their
guarantees, they are in a fundamentally different position from the sovereign’s direct
creditors. By definition, the holder of a sovereign guaranteed bond benefits from the
credit of both the primary obligor and that of the sovereign guarantor; in the jargon,
the creditor is holding “two-name paper”. Giving such a creditor the same deal as
that offered to direct creditors of the sovereign would effectively attribute no value to
the credit of the primary obligor. But any attempt to sweeten the terms of the
restructuring for contingent sovereign creditors in order to compensate those holders
for the surrender of their claim against the primary obligor requires someone to put a
11
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monetary value on that second credit risk. This could be a delicate and politically
sensitive task when the primary obligor is a state-owned or controlled enterprise.
In short, the restructurer’s dilemma is that contingent liabilities, if
they are of any material size, cannot safely be left out of a sovereign debt
restructuring, nor can they easily be included in a sovereign debt restructuring. This
problem wasn’t a problem for so long as contingent liabilities represented only a
small part of the debt stocks of affected countries. But for many countries, that
period ended with the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008. The problem
will therefore be unavoidable in at least some of the sovereign debt restructurings yet
to come.
In the bankruptcy of a corporate borrower in the United States (let’s
call it Acme Corporation), the value of any contingent claims against Acme that are
not expected to be crystalized before the bankruptcy proceeding ends may be
estimated for purposes of allowing the beneficiary’s claim to be filed in the
insolvency proceeding. (See U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 502(c)(1).) This is done to
avoid unduly prolonging the administration of Acme’s estate or forcing the
administrator to establish a reserve against the claim. If it appears that the primary
obligor will be able to pay the debt out of its own resources (without requiring a call
on Acme’s guarantee), then the beneficiary’s claim in Acme’s bankruptcy may be
estimated at zero or close to it.
VI. Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Obligations
How hard would it be to cast the net of a sovereign debt restructuring
wide enough to catch the sovereign’s contingent obligations?
(a)

Voluntary offers

If the debt restructuring is conducted as a purely voluntary exchange
(that is, no use of CACs, embedded or retrofit), and involves delivery of new debt
instruments of the sovereign in exchange for outstanding sovereign guaranteed
bonds, the holders of contingent sovereign paper can be expected to ask for a sweeter
deal than that offered to the direct creditors. The justification will be that this
additional consideration is needed to compensate for the creditors’ surrender of a
claim against the first name (the primary obligor) of their two-name paper. Apart
from the politically delicate job of deciding whether the incremental credit risk of a
parastatal on a debt instrument is worth a nickel or a dime or something more,
different values would logically need to be assigned for each of the primary obligors,
a tedious and possibly controversial task.
The alternative would involve restructuring each guaranteed bond in a
manner that maintains the primary obligor as the first name on the paper. This could
be done either by exchanging each old guaranteed bond for a new guaranteed bond
with the same parties, or else attempting to modify the terms of that old bond within
its four corners (no exchange). This approach would address the concern about the
12
[NEWYORK 2757365_2]

loss of the creditor’s claim against the primary obligor, but it could significantly
complicate the mechanics of the restructuring. For one thing, it would be tantamount
to a separate restructuring for each guaranteed bond. Because the primary obligors
would continue as a credit risk on the restructured debt instruments, the securities
laws in many jurisdictions would require separate disclosure for each of those
primary obligors in the exchange offer. Instead of issuing a single series of
sovereign bonds for exchange with existing debtholders, the restructuring would
involve the issuance, listing and administration of multiple series of bonds, each
corresponding to an underlying guaranteed debt instrument.
(b)

Less-than-voluntary offers

A debt restructuring that does not rely exclusively on persuasion to
bring creditors into the deal will face its own set of problems with contingent
sovereign obligations.
Collective action clauses (CACs). One immediate question will be
whether the terms of the guarantee will need to be amended separately from, or in
parallel with, a modification of the terms of the underlying debt instrument. If the
underlying instrument does not include a collective action clause of some kind, its
amendment -- and the corresponding amendment of the related guarantee -- would
presumably require the unanimous consent of each debtholder. Even where the
underlying debt instrument contains a CAC, however, the related sovereign
guarantee almost certainly will not. Our research suggests that CACs are almost
never incorporated in sovereign guarantees.
Somewhat more common, but still quite rare, is for the CAC
appearing in the underlying bond to permit changes to the accompanying sovereign
guarantee. As Figure 2 shows, of the guaranteed bonds with CACs in our database,
fewer than 10% permitted modifications by a supermajority vote of creditors to both
the underlying bond and the accompanying guarantee.

13
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Figure 3: Number of Sovereign Guarantees with
CACs mentioning Guarantee Modification
(Jan 1, 1965-2013 - July 1, 2013)
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Why should contract drafters who were cautious enough to put CACs
in their bonds have felt it unnecessary to incorporate a similar feature in the
accompanying guarantees? The most plausible explanation is that the drafters
simply didn’t see the need to do so. The guarantee promises payment of the bond on
the dates and in the amounts due. If the creditors agree to amend the terms of the
bond, this argument goes, the terms of the guarantee will automatically wrap around
those modified terms.
This assumption may be a bit too facile. For one thing, the wording
of the guarantee could be crucial. For example, a Republic of Turkey sovereign
guarantee in our database recites that:
The intention and purpose of this Guarantee is to ensure
that the Bondholders . . . shall receive the amounts
payable as interest and principal as and when due and
payable according to the Issue Terms . . .16

16

The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, DM200,000,000 7% Deutsche Mark Bearer Bonds of
1987/1992, irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed by the Republic of Turkey, (emphasis added).
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No mention is made of a possible modification to the original Issue Terms. It is
therefore not clear whether an amendment to the terms of the underlying bond would
automatically result in a corresponding amendment to the accompanying guarantee.
More importantly, the amendment of a sovereign guaranteed bond
through the use of a collective action clause is still an unusual event and would raise
novel legal issues.
If a supermajority of bondholders can alter the terms of an underlying
bond through a collective action clause, but no similar contractual flexibility exits to
modify the terms of the related sovereign guarantee, can a disaffected minority of
bondholders insist on payment by the guarantor of the amounts originally due under
the bond? The argument against permitting such a claim focuses on the words of the
guarantee promising payment “when due” of the primary obligor’s obligations under
the bond. If those obligations are extended or reduced in a manner permitted by the
terms of the bond (through the exercise of the CAC), the argument goes, the
guarantee should automatically wrap around the amended terms.
The argument in favor of allowing those disgruntled creditors to insist
on strict performance of the guarantee has several components. First, these
guarantees are often deliberately set up to be free standing, separately enforceable
instruments; the guarantor is frequently described as being liable as a “primary
obligor and not merely as surety” of the underlying obligation. If a supermajority of
bondholders wish to modify the terms of the underlying obligation, the presence of a
CAC may allow them to sweep along a disaffected minority at that level. But absent
a CAC in the guarantee, the consent of each beneficiary of the guarantee would
appear to be required to effect a parallel amendment of that instrument. Second, had
the drafter of the guarantee wanted to permit its terms to be modified with less than
the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries, this would have been easy to do. Under
normal principles of contract interpretation a court would not read such a
modification clause into the document. Finally, many guarantees contain language
similar to the following:
The liability of the Guarantor hereunder shall be
absolute and unconditional irrespective of any change
in the time, manner or place of payment, or any other
term of, the [underlying obligation].17

17

This language is included in a guarantee to ensure that the guarantor is not released if the lender
agrees to vary the terms of the underlying obligation. See Raymer McQuiston, Drafting an
Enforceable Guaranty in an International Financing Transaction: A Lender’s Perspective, 10 INT’L
TAX AND BUS. LAWYER 138, 156 (1993) (“Common law courts have ruled consistently that a
variation or change in the terms of the underlying loan agreement without the guarantor’s consent …
justifies a release of the guarantor from its obligations.”) That said, a bondholder might argue that the
language could equally be seen as preserving a bondholder’s claim against the guarantor to perform
the unamended terms of the underlying instrument unless that lender has also agreed to amend the
guarantee.
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This situation (a conflict between a “collective action” amendment of
an underlying obligation and the modification of an accompanying guarantee) is not
well developed in U.S. law for the simple reason that collective action modification
clauses fell out of favor in corporate debt instruments in the United States in the
1930s, and have only recently (since 2003) begun to appear in sovereign debt
instruments governed by the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. In a traditional U.S.
amendment clause requiring the unanimous consent of all creditors for a change to
payment terms, the issue does not arise; by definition, every holder will have
consented to the change.
Governing law. A sovereign fortunate enough to have its guarantees
governed by its own law may (subject to constitutional constraints) be able to
encourage holders of its contingent obligations to accept a restructuring by
threatening to pass domestic legislation containing a sentence along these lines:
All guarantees issued by the Republic of Ruritania in
respect of debt obligations of third parties that are
eligible to participate in the [Ruritanian restructuring]
shall, if called by the beneficiary at any time after the
closing of the [Ruritanian restructuring], be satisfied
and discharged in full by delivery to the creditor of
consideration equivalent to that offered in the
[Ruritanian restructuring].
The effect of such a provision would be to remove any incentive on
the part of the beneficiary of a state guarantee to refrain from calling on the
guarantee at the time of the main restructuring. It is thus a statutory expression of
the warning that Grenada gave in 2005 to the holders of its contingent obligations
(see text accompanying footnote 13 above). In a debt restructuring, a local law
guarantee thus provides the sovereign with considerable leverage.
One of the most startling conclusions of our empirical research has
been the split between the law chosen to govern underlying debt instruments and the
governing law of the related sovereign guarantee. Figure 3 suggests that until 2010,
a significant number of sovereign guarantees were governed by local law (the law of
the sovereign’s jurisdiction), even where the underlying bond was governed by
foreign law.
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Figure 4: Number of Sovereign Guarantees by Law of
Guarantee
(Jan 1, 1965 - July 1, 2013)
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This practice shifted abruptly starting in 2010, probably because the
Greek crisis highlighted the added risks for the holders of debt instruments governed
by local law.18 Post Greece, bondholders were no longer as willing to allow their
guarantees to be governed by the sovereign’s own law. This is, we believe, a
particularly vivid example of documentation practices in cross-border debt
instruments responding almost immediately to the market’s perception of a new -- or
in this case, an overlooked – legal risk.
Waiver of immunity. All creditors of sovereigns face the daunting
challenge of enforcing their claims against a recalcitrant debtor, but most benefit
from an express waiver by the sovereign of any entitlement that the sovereign (or its
property) may enjoy based on sovereign immunity. Figure 5 suggests, however, that
such express waivers of immunity are far less common in sovereign guarantees than
one might have thought.

18

The Greek Parliament retrofit a collective action mechanism on its local law debt stock in early
2012 in order to facilitate a restructuring of those obligations. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph
Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy, Duke Law School Working Paper
(Sept. 11, 2012 draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932
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Figure 5: Number of Guaranteed Bonds with Waivers
of Sovereign Immunity
(Jan 1, 1965 – July 1, 2013)
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The absence of an express waiver of immunity does not make it
impossible to enforce a guarantee against a defaulting sovereign, but it will make the
enforcement process more difficult. Sovereigns can be expected to remind the
beneficiaries of their guarantees of this likely difficulty as a means of encouraging
those beneficiaries to join a general restructuring.
VII. Conclusion
Our conclusions are -

In a number of important countries, sovereign guarantees have
become so prevalent that they cannot be ignored in any future debt
workouts that may be needed for those countries.



Exactly how the contingent portion of a sovereign’s debt stock is
to be addressed in such a restructuring remains a mystery. There
are very few precedents and no good precedents.



For a while at least (until existing bonds mature and are replaced
by new issues with more pro-creditor provisions), some
sovereigns will benefit in a debt restructuring from the
prelapsarian innocence shown in the contract drafting patterns that
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prevailed before 2010 in areas such as governing law and waiver
of immunities.


One thing seems certain: the presence of a significant number of
contingent liabilities in a sovereign’s debt stock will present major
complications for the architects of a debt restructuring for that
country. Not the least of these will be psychological. The need to
address contingent liabilities will force everyone -- creditors,
official sector sponsors and citizens -- to watch with alarm as
heretofore off balance sheet liabilities come rushing on to the
sovereign’s balance sheet, just in time to be restructured.
*

*

*
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